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IV 
IN THE UTAH UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050600-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court granted certiorari review of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision affirming 
defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to 
consider the petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & (5) (West 2004). 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that a robber who feigns possession of a 
gun by placing a hand in his pocket may be charged with aggravated robbery under Utah 
law? 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 209,113 P.3d 
1028, was issued May 12, 2005, and is attached as Addendum A. The Utah Court of 
Appeals decision in the related case of State v. Johnson, 2005 UT App 210 (Memorandum 
Decision), also issued May 12, 2005, is attached as Addendum B. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in full in Addendum 
C: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information dated December 9, 2003, with aggravated 
robbery, a first-degree felony, and theft of services, a class B misdemeanor. R. 6-7. The 
Information alleged that defendant robbed a downtown jewelry store on December 6,2003. 
R. 6-8. 
Defendant filed a motion to reduce the robbery charge from aggravated robbery to 
simple robbery. R. 38. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and heard arguments on 
March 17,2004. R. 114. The court denied the motion by minute entry on March 29, 2004, 
R. 52, then issued a memorandum decision on April 2, 2004. R. 54-61 and Addendum E. 
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Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to aggravated robbery on April 4, 2004, 
specifically preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to reduce the charge. R. 
73. 
On June 7,2004, defendant was sentenced to zero to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. 
R.94. 
On June 11, 2004, defendant filed a notice of appeal. 
On May 12,2005, the Court of Appeals issued a published opinion upholding the trial 
court's ruling that defendant was properly charged with aggravated robbery. See 
Addendum A. 
On July 8, 2005, defendant filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari with this 
Court. This Court granted the petition on October 24, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"Bristly" 
Other than needing a shave, defendant's appearance on the day he robbed a 
Gateway Mall jewelry store was fairly ordinary. R. 114:17 (Transcript of Motion 
Hearing, dated March 17, 2004, attached as Addendum D). 
"I noticed that he had on a thick puffy coat and he had on a beanie," recalled 
Jeffrey Reinkoester, a sales associate at the store. "I noticed that he was very bristly, 
didn't shave in a day or two, and that he was coming very determined into the store." Id. 
Reinkoester greeted defendant like any ordinary customer. But the response he 
got was anything but ordinary. 
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"I want you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now," 
defendant stated. R. 114:9. As defendant made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester 
with his right hand, which he kept concealed in the pocket of his coat. 
"There was one hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun," Reinkoester 
recalled. R. 114:11. 
"I'm not kidding," defendant added. "Hurry." R. 114:20. 
"Do you want the change? " 
Reinkoester immediately moved behind the counter toward the cash register. R. 
114:20-21. Defendant tracked Reinkoester's movements and continued to point with the 
hand in his pocket. R. 114:12, 13,21. 
Reinkoester opened the cash register and began retrieving money. However, there 
was not much in the till and defendant was not pleased. R. 114:13. 
"Is that all you've got?" defendant asked after Reinkoester filled a bag with the 
cash. Id. 
"Yes," Reinkoester said. Then he held out a roll of quarters. "Do you want the 
change?" Id. 
Defendant replied: "Fill it with jewelry." Id. 
Apparently changing his mind, defendant stated, "Just give it to me." He then took 
the bag and ran to the front door. R. 114:15. 
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The chase 
Defendant, however, did not make a clean getaway. Nelson Fortier, the 
storeowner, apparently realized a robbery was in progress and attempted to block 
defendant's way. Id. 
"Don't block the fucking door," defendant said, pushing Fortier out of the way. 
Id;R.l. 
Fortier allowed defendant to leave, but then chased after him. R. 114:15. Once 
outside, defendant climbed into a cab, but Fortier told the driver not to leave because 
defendant had just robbed the jewelry store. R. 7. Defendant then exited the cab and ran 
off with Fortier still in pursuit. Id. Fortier finally caught up with defendant and 
demanded he return the money. Defendant complied, then ran off again, but was later 
arrested. Id. at 7-8. 
The motion hearing 
On March 17, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to reduce 
the aggravated robbery charge to simple robbery. R. 114; Addendum D. Defendant 
claimed that the aggravated robbery charge was not proper under Utah law because he 
had not used or threatened to use a "dangerous weapon" as that term is defined. R. 38-
44. 
In opposing the motion, the State argued that the aggravated robbery statutes, 
when properly interpreted in light of Utah caselaw, cover situations in which non-verbal 
conduct—such as defendant's coat-pocket pointing gesture—constitutes a 
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"representation" of a dangerous weapon, which is punishable just as if the defendant 
actually possessed such a weapon. R. 42-44. 
Reinkoester was the sole witness to testify at the hearing. His testimony was that 
he believed defendant had a gun, even though he never saw one and even though 
defendant did not verbally claim to have one. 
Q. And after he said get me the money in the cash drawer, what did you do? 
A. [by Reinkoester] I said all right. I circled around and came behind the cash 
drawer and we met over there and I proceeded on getting the cash. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. Because I thought he had a weapon. 
Q. Did he say he had a weapon? 
A. No. 
Q. What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon? 
A. The motioning in the coat pocket. 
R. 114:13. 
Q. Why didn't you say anything to Dominique [another store worker]? 
A. Fear 
Q. Fear of what? 
A. Fear of reprisal from the suspect. 
Q. In what way? 
A. Maybe being shot. 
R. 114:27. 
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On April 2,2004, the trial i otirl issued a Memorandum Decision denying defendant's 
motion. R. 54-60. See Memorandum Decision, Addendum E. The court stated: 
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce a victim to believe the 
defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to perform some act 
based on the defendants representations and then allow the defendant o 
benefit when it is later shown the defendant in fact had no such weapon. The 
Court finds in this case that the defendant's placement of his hand in his 
pocket and the gesturing accompanying it, as testified to by the witness, 
constituted a representation. Therefore, the State is within its discretion in 
charging this matter as a first-degree felony. 
R. 58. 
The Utah Court of Appeals agreed. In rejecting defendant's claim that his conduct did 
not meet the elements of aggravated robbery, the court of appeals held: 
[W]e determine that Reinkoester reasonably believed that the "item [wasJ 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury"... Reinkoester testified that 
he feared that if he did not comply with Ireland's request, he may be shot. 
Guns by their very nature are capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. Reinkoester's belief was based not only on the subjective belief that he 
thought Ireland had a gun, but also on objective evidence. Reinkoester saw 
something "pointing at [him]" inside Ireland's coat pocket. That something 
"looked like a gun." This is sufficient objective evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that one might have been injured if he or she did not comply. 
Ireland, 2005 UT App 209 at \ 12, Addendum A. 
SUMMARY OF
 A R G y M E ^ r 
Point I: The plain meaning of Utah's aggravated robbery statutes support the court of 
appeals' determination that defendant's use of his hand in his coat pocket to simulate a gun is 
sufficient to meet the definition of aggravated robbery. 
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Point II: Relevant precedent from Utah and the vast majority of jurisdictions support 
the interpretation of Utah's armed robbery statutes to encompass gestures such as 
defendant's use of his hand in his coat pocket to simulate a gun. 
Point III: An interpretation of Utah's armed robbery statutes that requires a victim to 
confirm that a robber actually possesses a gun would be bad public policy because the 
consequence of guessing incorrectly could be disastrous. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT'S USE OF HIS HAND IN HIS POCKET TO 
SIMULATE A GUN WAS A "REPRESENTATION" OF A 
"DANGEROUS WEAPON55 WHICH, THEREFORE, 
CONSTITUTED AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
Defendant claims that under Utah law, he cannot be found guilty of aggravated 
robbery, even though he pointed toward the victim with his hand in his coat pocket in a 
manner that is almost universally recognized to indicate the presence of a gun. "Even if a 
concealed hand in the pocket qualifies as a representation under the first part of the statute, a 
further representation, verbal or otherwise, that the robber will use the gun or objective facts 
that make it reasonable to believe that the item is likely to cause death is required in order to 
elevate the crime to aggravated robbery." Aplt. Br. at 5. A plain reading of Utah statutes 
defining aggravated robbery shows defendant's claim is meritless. 
In construing a statute, this Court must attempt to "'ascertain and effectuate the 
Legislature's intent/" State v. Hunt, 906 R.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). The 
Legislature's intent and purpose is most often evident from the plain language of the statute. 
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Id. If possible, ti - . >ry language should be given a literal meaning. State v. Ewell, 886 
P.2d 1260,1363 (Utah App. 1993). Where the plain language of statute is clear, there is no 
need to look further. Lovendahlv. Jordan School District, 2002 I J' 1 130,, 11 58, 63 P.3d 705 
(Durrant, J., concurring and dissenting willi two justices coilcurring); see also Okeefe v. Utah 
State Retirement Board, 956 R.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (the term "overtime" is clear and 
unambiguous and the court has "no need to resort to other methods of construction"); Visitor 
Autk Info. Cntr. v. Customer Service Division, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (I Jtah 1997) ("Unless 
the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the uncertain 
facts of legislative history"); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 
890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be 
held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction"). A reviewing court 
should not add or subtract statutory terms. Reinkraut v. Shalala, 854 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D. 
Utah 1994). "Under the plain meaning rule, we seek the meaning of the statute from its very 
language, and if it is straightforward, we simply enforce it according to its terms. Its words 
then bear 'their ordinary meaning and the statute is not to be read so as to add or subtract 
from [that] which is stated. . 7" Gardener v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir. 
1996) (citation omitted). 
Under Utah law, a person commits simple robbery if he or she "unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a 
purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or tenlporarily of the personal property; 
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. . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004). By contrast, a person commits aggravated 
robbery if in course of committing robbery, he "uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon 
as defined in Section 76-1-601; . . ." Utah Code Ann § 76-6-302 (emphasis added). 
"Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of 
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe 
the item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or 
in any other manner that he is in control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-601(5) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
Under and plain meaning of the statute, defendant's admitted conduct constitutes 
aggravated robbery. Clearly, the coat-pocket gesture was intended as a show of "force" to 
create sufficient "fear" in Reinkoester that he would comply with defendant's demands. 
And, because the coat-pocket gesture constitutes a show of force by conveying to a 
reasonable person that the assailant has a gun, it also constitutes a "threat" for purposes of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
2382 (1993), "threaten" means "to give signs of the approach of (something evil or 
unpleasant): indicate as impending: portend".1 For Reinkoester—or, indeed, any store clerk 
1
 "In the case of unambiguous statutes, this court has a long history of relying on 
dictionary definitions to determine plain meaning." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, If 11, 992 
P.2d 986 (Utah 1996). 
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or teller faced with such a coat-pocket gesture—the "approaching evil" was the possibility of 
being shot with a "dangerous weapon." 
A "dangerous weapon" is "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury[] or ^facsimile or representation of the item." Utah ('ode \nn § 76-6-601(5)(a) & 
(b). A facsimile, according to Webster's, is "an exact and detailed copy of something." Id. 
at 813. For example, a toy gun or a replica of a gun would be a facsimile. There is no 
allegation that defendant used a facsimile; rather, he is accused of using a "representation" of 
a dangerous weapon. When defendant placed his hand in his pocket and pointed toward 
Reinkoester, he intentionally represented that he had a dangerous weapon, to wit: a handgun. 
He did so non-verbally by "portrayal or delineation. . . in a visible image or form." See 
Webster's at 1926 (defining "representation"). 
Defendant's "use or apparent intended use of the item [led] the victim to reasonably 
believe the item [was] likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;..." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-60 l(5)(b)(I). Something is "apparent" if it is "capable of easy perception[;] readily 
perceptible to the senses, esp sight[;J... Readily manifest to the senses or mind as real or 
true and supported by credible evidence..." Webster's at 102. Defendant's coat-pocket 
gesture has a meaning that is "readily perceptible": "I have a gun and I'm prepared to use 
it." Indeed, Reinkoester testified that he complied with the demands precisely because he 
believed defendant may have a gun concealed in his coat pocket and was pointing it at him 
while demanding money and jewels. 
Q. And after he said get me the money in the cash drawer, what did you do? 
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A. [by Reinkoester] I said all right. I circled around and came behind the cash 
drawer and we met over there and I proceeded on getting the cash. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. Because I thought he had a weapon. 
Q. Did he say he had a weapon? 
A. No. 
Q. What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon? 
A. The motioning in the coat pocket. 
R. 114:13. 
Q. Why didn't you say anything to Dominique [another store worker]? 
A. Fear 
Q. Fear of what? 
A. Fear of reprisal from the suspect. 
Q. In what way? 
A. Maybe being shot. 
R. 114:27. 
Defendant does not contest that he committed simple robbery; rather, he claims there 
were no aggravating factors because he did not possess, display or "represent" a "dangerous 
weapon." In defendant's view, he simply walked into the jewelry store, stated "I want you to 
go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now" and Reinkoester was more than 
happy to comply. R. 114:9. 
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The problem is that defendant's version makes no sense logically or legally. 
Salesmen do not ordinarily turn over cash and jewels upon demand; they do so only when 
demands are backed up by a threat of harm, generally from some kind of weapon. By 
ignoring or minimizing the significance of the coat-pocket gesture, defendant advocates a 
view akin to the fabled "elephant in the room"—something everyone sees but refuses to 
acknowledge. This Court need not turn a blind eye to the obvious. Under the plain meaning 
of the statutes, defendant robbed the jewelry store by using the "representation" of a 
"dangerous weapon" to threaten Reinkoester and force him to comply with defendant's 
demands. Defendant is, accordingly, guilty of aggravated robbery and the court of appeals 
properly affirmed his conviction. 
II. DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
BECAUSE HIS NON-VERBAL CONDUCT CREATED THE 
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE BELIEF THAT HE POSSESSED A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON. 
Defendant insists that if he could be convicted or aggravated robbery because he 
placed his hand in his pocket to simulate a gun, the distinction between simple and 
aggravated robbery would be lost because it would leave the aggravating factor—the 
presence of a dangerous weapon—up to the "subjective reaction of the victim..." Aplt. Br. 
at 18. "[B]y allowing the subjective reaction of the victim to play a role in determining 
whether a defendant committed a simple or aggravated robbery, the court of appeals 
disregarded this Court's concerns in Suniville and opened the door for inconsistent 
application of the aggravated robbery statute based in part on a victim's predisposition for 
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anxiety, fear or embellishment rather than the objective conduct of the robbery." Id. (citing 
State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987)). 
Defendant is incorrect. Non-verbal conduct such as defendant's coat-pocket gesture 
unequivocally—and objectively—communicates a threat with a dangerous weapon, as the 
history of Utah's aggravated robbery statutes demonstrates. Indeed, the Legislature's 
amendment of the statutes in the wake of Suniville demonstrates a clear intent to include 
conduct such as defendant's non-verbal gesture within the definition of aggravated robbery. 
Utah's aggravated robbery statutes were amended in 1989 following this Court's 
Sunivilh decision, which held that a robber who feigns possession of a firearm could not be 
convicted of aggravated robbery. In Suniville, the defendant, wearing a dark ski mask, 
approached a bank teller, lifted his hand inside his coat pocket over the counter and pointed. 
Suniville, 741 P.2d at 962. According to the teller, the gesture made it look "like he had a 
gun," even though he did not say he had a gun and the teller did not see a gun. Id. The 
robber said only: "This is a robbery, don't turn it into a homicide. Give me all your money." 
Id. The teller complied and produced about $ 1,500, which the robber grabbed with his left 
hand; his right hand remained in his pocket throughout. Id. 
The trial court ruled that Suniville's actions fell within the ambit of Utah's aggravated 
robbery statute, which at that time elevated the crime if the robber used "a firearm or a 
facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon . . . " Id. at 963-64 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(l)(a) (1987 version)). The trial court stated that "when 
one uses any object with the intent to make the victim believe there is a gun and that the 
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victim reasoiiabl} coiild believe there is a gun, that whatever object is being used is, in fact, a 
facsimile of a firearm, whether it is a piece of pipe in the pocket or a plastic gun or even a 
f inger , . . ." Id. 
This Court disagreed. Reversing Siiniville's conviction, the Court i loted that the term 
"facsimile," which is defined as "'an exact copy, preserving all the marks of the original,5" 
id. at 963 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 531 (rev. 5 th ed. 1979, and4th ed. 1968, at 706)), 
cannot encompass defendant's "menacing gesture accompanied u..A - nuoating the 
presence of a gun." Id. at 965. 
Nonetheless, the Court recognized the validity of cases from other jurisdictions that 
interpreted broader statutory language to include the use of feigned weapons within the 
definition of aggravated, robbei > Id. at 964. For example, the Court cited Breedlove v. 
State, 482 So.2d 1277 (Ala.Crim.App.1985) and the Alabama aggravated robbery statute, 
which stated that" ' an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any person who is present 
reasonably to believe it to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instr i uiient, oi ai i> v erbal or 
other representation by the defendant that he is then and there so armed, is prima facie 
evidence . . . that he is so armed.'" Suniville, 741 P.2d at 964 (quoting Ala. Code § 13A-8-
41(b) (1975)); see also State v. Hopson, 362 N.W.2d 166 (Wis, Ct. App.1984) (aggravated 
robbery committed "'by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon or any article used or 
fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe that it is a dangerous weapon. 
. .'") (quoting Wis. Stat. Ann. § 943.32(l)(b), (2) (1985)) (cited in Suniville, 741 P.2d at 
964). 
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In 1989, the Utah Legislature amended Utah's aggravated robbery statutes to cover 
feigned weapons cases. The term "facsimile" was retained, but lawmakers added the broader 
category of robbery committed through a "representation" of a dangerous weapon. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b). Under the new statutes, a person commits aggravated robbery 
through use of a facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon if he or she also either (1) 
uses or apparently intends to use the item represented in a way that "leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;" or (2) " 
represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b)(i) & (ii). 
As argued in Point I, the plain language of the statutes covers feigned weapons cases 
in which the bandit non-verbally "represents" possession of a dangerous weapon by placing 
a hand or object in a pocket and pointing it at a victim. And, in fact, the language of the 
statutes has been given expansive interpretation by this Court and the Utah court of appeals. 
In State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 544 (Utah 1989), this Court recognized that simulated 
or feigned weapons could fit the definition of a "dangerous weapon" under Utah law. 
Hartmann was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated burglary after he broke 
into a woman's apartment and raped her by claiming that he had a gun and would shoot her 
children if they awoke and came to investigate. Id. at 545. Hartmann claimed that verbal 
threats alone cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance. Id. at 546, 547. In 
affirming Hartmann's conviction, this Court disagreed: 
Threats may be communicated by action or conduct as well as by words... . 
When a verbal threat of "death, or serious bodily injury to be inflicted 
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imminently on any person'' is made during the course of a rape or forcible 
sodomy, the aggravated circumstance requirement . . .is fully satisfied. 
Id. at 547 (internal citation omitted; emphasis added). The Court also noted that "threats are 
particularly terrifying whether or not the perpetrator actually possesses a weapon." Id. 
In State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah App. 1995), the court oi appeals upheld 
the aggravated robbery conviction of a defendant who told the victim he had a gun, although 
he did not display a weapon or anything that appeared to be a weapon. Id. at 277. In the 
opinion, the court carefully distinguished between a "facsimile," which is "an exact and 
detailed copy", and "representation," which 
is an expansive term, and, while it can mean "a likeness, 
picture, model, or other reproduction," it can also refer to "a 
statement or account especially] made to convey.. .[an] 
impression of something with the intention of influencing . . . 
action." 
Candelario, 909 R.2d at 278 (citing Webster's Third New Int 7 Dictionary 813,1926 (1986)) 
(emphasis added). According to the court, "representation" has a variety of meanings which 
include not only verbal representation, but also "a likeness, pitlmc, model ot other 
reproduction." Id. Moreover, the court explicitly pointed out that, regarding the 
representation concerning a "dangerous weapon" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-601, "such a 
statement can be either in the form of a verbal assertion or nonverbal action'' Id at n.2 
(emphasis added). Thus, under the correct interpretation and application of Utah law, 
defendant's use of his finger or other artifice during the course of the robbery was a 
representation of a firearm in the sense that it was, at minimum, a "likeness, model or other 
reproduction" of a gun. Id.; see also State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310,313-14 (1 Hah App. 1992) 
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(affirming aggravated robbery conviction where defendant touched a bulge in his pants and 
threatened to shoot). 
The court of appeals' reasoning in Candelario is compelling and has been echoed in 
other jurisdictions with similar aggravated robbery statutes. For example, in People v. 
Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. App. 2001), defendant claimed a fatal lack of "objective" 
evidence to support his conviction for the armed robbery of a convenience store because he 
merely held a hand inside his jacket and pants while telling the cashier "This is a stick up" 
and "Open the [cash] drawer." Id. at 58. In Michigan, armed robbery is committed when the 
robber is "armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to 
lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon..." Id. at 57 
(citing Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.797). In affirming that defendant committed armed robbery by 
placing his hand in his jacket and pants, the court stated: 
While this portion of the armed robbery statute focuses on the belief of the 
victim that the defendant was armed, that belief must be reasonable and our 
courts have long recognized that the victim's subjective belief alone is 
insufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery. . . . Therefore, the 
prosecutor must submit "some objective evidence of the existence of a 
weapon or article" to the finder of fact. 
Id. at 59 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). The court found the evidence against the 
defendant 
went well beyond a mere subjective belief that defendant was armed during 
the robbery. Rather, there was ample objective evidence that defendant either 
had a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately lead complainant to 
"reasonably believe" he had a gun. Complainant testified that, during the 
robbery, defendant placed his hand inside his jacket and into the front of his 
pants. Objectively, defendant could have carried a weapon under his jacket 
and in his waistband. 
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Id. at 61. 
The court also explicitly rejected the defendant's contention that a gesture simulating 
the presence of a weapon without more is insufficient to constitute armed i obbery. 
[W]e decline to hold that a defendant must verbally threaten the victim with 
some specific bodily harm in order to obtain a conviction of armed robbery. 
If there is sufficient evidence that, during the course of the robbery, the 
defendant simulates a weapon so as to induce the victim to reasonably believe 
he is armed and, by word or conduct, threatens the victim by announcing a 
robbery or otherwise suggesting the potential use of the weapon, then the 
defendant may be convicted of armed robbery. 
Id 
This view is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the 
issue. See, e.g., Lynn Considine Cobb, Annotation, Robbery by Means of Toy or Simulated 
Gun or Pistol, 81 A.L.RJd 100b. i oi example, in Faulkner v. State, 581 S.E.2d365 (Ga. 
App. 2003), the defendant entered a tanning salon with a white sock covering his hand. As 
he approached the cash register, an employee saw that the sock concealed something shaped 
like a gun. Defendant pressed the sock into the employee's back anil told her to open the 
register. The employee testified that something in the sock "felt like . . .a gun," that she 
believed it was a gun and that she was afraid. Id. at 366-67. Defendant was convicted of 
armed robbery—the taking of property of another from the person or the immediate presence 
of another "by use of an offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the 
appearance of such weapon." Id at 367. The defendant claimed the evidence was insufficient 
to sustain a conviction for armed robbery because there was no evidence of a weapon and no 
evidence that the victim's apprehension was reasonable. Id. The appellate court disagreed, 
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noting that although the defendant "may not have displayed a gun to the tanning salon 
employee, the evidence authorized a finding that he used an article that had the appearance 
of a gun to persuade her to comply with his demand and that his acts created a reasonable 
apprehension on her part that he was threatening her with a gun." Id. 
In State v. Arena, 663 A.2d 972, 978 (Conn. 1995), the court considered whether a 
defendant convicted of robbery was entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction because 
an object concealed in a plastic bag could have been something other than a gun. Witnesses 
testified that the defendant approached a checkout counter and stated, "Put all the money in a 
bag." At the same time, the defendant placed an opaque plastic shopping bag on the counter 
and pointed it at the checker. The bag contained an object that was round and about 16 
inches long, which the checker testified looked like a gun. Id. at 974. The defendant 
requested a lesser-included-offense instruction based on testimony from one witness who, on 
cross-examination, agreed that the object inside the bag could have been a club. Id. at 978. 
The trial court denied the defendant's request for a lesser-included-offense instruction and 
the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed. "The state only had to prove that the defendant 
represented by his conduct that he had a firearm. The actual contents of the bag are 
irrelevant. There is no evidence that the defendant represented by his words or conduct that 
he had something other than a firearm." Id. (emphasis in original). 
In People v. Lopez, 135 A.D.2d 443 (N.Y. App. 1987), defendant approached the 
victim and stated, "[T]his is a stick up, give me your radio." At the same time, defendant 
placed his hand inside his vest pocket, "as if he had a gun." Id. at 443. The victim, believing 
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defendant had a gun, turned over his radio. Id. Defendant was tried and convicted of two 
counts of robbery, one involving the use of a weapon. However, the trial court dismissed the 
weapon-related count on motion from defendant because, even though defendant placed his 
hand in his vest, "his hand never formed the shape of any object." Id. The New York 
appellate court reversed. "Where an unarmed robber holds his hand in his pocket so as to 
give the impression that he is holding a gun, he has '[d]isplay[ed] what appears to be . . . a 
firearm' within the meaning of the statute.' Id. at 444. 
In State v. Ellison, 819 P.2d 1010 (Ariz. App. 1991), the court held that defendant and 
an accomplice were guilty of armed robbery because they were either "armed with a deadly 
weapon or a simulated deadly weapon" or "use[d] or threatened] to use a deadly weapon or 
dangerous instrument or a simulated deadly weapon." Id. at 1012 (citing Arizona Revised 
Statues § 13- 1904(A)). "They committed the robberies by positioning their hands to make 
their hands appear as if they instead were deadly weapons." Id. at 1013. 
Despite clear Utah precedent recognizing that a robber's non-verbal representation 
that he possesses a gun meets the definitional requirements of Utah's aggravated robbery 
statutes—and despite the overwhelming concurrence of the majority of jurisdictions with 
similar statutes—defendant persists. His principal complaint seems to be that the court of 
appeals' Ireland opinion blurs the distinction between simple and aggravated robbery by 
ignoring subsections (i) and (ii) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b). Defendant's position 
seems to be that although a finger or object in a pocket may be a "representation" of a 
dangerous weapon, thus satisfying section (b), it does not "lead the victim to reasonably 
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believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury" (subsection (i)) or 
"represent[] to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an 
item" (subsection (ii)). Aplt. Br. at 18 (citing Ireland, 2005 UT App. 209 at 1Hf7-13). 
Defendant comes to this conclusion by taking an unnecessarily narrow view of the 
term "representation" and the gestures that may constitute representations. Defendant seems 
to believe that if a coat-pocket gesture is deemed a "representation" of a gun, it cannot at the 
same time communicate that the representation is likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury or "represent" that the robber is in possession of such a dangerous weapon. But 
defendant provides no reason to construe the language so narrowly. A "representation" of a 
dangerous weapon may also communicate that such a representation is "likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury." A robber who employs such a "representation" is also 
representing, "verbally or in [some] other manner," that he is in possession of the means to 
cause serious bodily injury or death. Thus, contrary to defendant's claim that the Ireland 
opinion ignores the two subsections, it actually shows that defendant's conduct meets both 
subsections. 
In support of this unnecessarily restrictive reading of Utah aggravated robbery 
statutes, defendant cites cases from two jurisdictions—Kentucky and Michigan. See, e.g., 
Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1986)) and 17 (citing 
People v. Banks, 563 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Mich. 1997); People v. Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55 
(Mich. App. 2001)). However, these cases are either irrelevant or unpersuasive. Williams is 
a Kentucky case relied upon by this Court in Suniville in determining that the defendant's 
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use of a feigned weapon could not constitute aggravated robbery. See Suniville, 741 P.2d at 
965 (citing Williams, 111 S.W.2d at 712-13). However, the Kentucky statute analyzed in 
Williams says nothing of "facsimiles" or "representations" or feigned weapons of any sort 
and so is of little use in interpreting Utah's current aggravated robbery statutes. Also, the 
1989 amendments to Utah's aggravated robbery statutes addressed the lacuna identified in 
Suniville. 
As for the Michigan cases, Defendant's reliance is misplaced given that authority 
from that jurisdiction is more favorable to the State's position. Defendant cites the Michigan 
cases in support of his claim that allowing a hand in a pocket to constitute a "representation" 
of a dangerous weapon would improperly define aggravated robbery "based on the 
subjective response of the victims,..." Aplt. Br. at 13. By contrast, "[i]n feigned weapons 
cases, the Michigan courts have required an objectively reasonable belief that the robbery is 
armed . . ." Aplt. Br. at 17. It is true that the Michigan courts have required objective 
evidence to support the victim's belief that a robber is armed. See, e.g., Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 
at 59. But it is also true that Michigan courts have recognized that a robber who reaches into 
his jacket and into the front of his pants has offered objective evidence to support the 
victim's belief that he had a weapon. Id. at 61. According to the court, such evidence 
went well beyond a mere subjective belief that defendant was armed during 
the robbery. Rather, there was ample objective evidence that defendant either 
had a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately lead complainant to 
"reasonably believe" he had a gun. Complainant testified that, during the 
robbery, defendant placed his hand inside his jacket and into the front of his 
pants. Objectively, defendant could have carried a weapon under his jacket 
and in his waistband. 
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Id. 
The foregoing authority demonstrates that court of appeals correctly held that 
defendant's "gesture of pointing his hand inside his coat pocket close to his right side with 
his elbow extended constitutes a representation of a dangerous weapon . . ." Ireland, 2005 
UT App 209 at f 11. Moreover, "[t]his is sufficient objective evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that one might have been injured if he or she did not comply" with 
defendants demands. Id. at^|12. This conclusion is consistent with Utah precedent because 
"[t]hreats may be communicated by action or conduct as well as by words...." Hartmann, 
783 P.2d at 547 (emphasis added). A representation of a "dangerous weapon" under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-601 may take "the form of a verbal assertion or nonverbal action." 
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278 n.2 (emphasis added). Such non-verbal action provides "ample 
objective evidence that defendant either had a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately lead 
complainant to 'reasonably believe' he had a gun. . ." Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 61. 
Accordingly, the court of appeals decision and defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
III. VICTIMS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO VERIFY THAT A 
WOULD-BE ROBBER IS ACTUALLY IN POSSESSION OF A 
WEAPON. 
In rejecting defendant's motion to reduce the charges against him from aggravated 
robbery to simple robbery, the trial court made an important observation: "[I]t is not fair, 
reasonable or wise to place the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in the 
defendant's pocket is or is not a weapon." R. 58 (Memorandum Decision, Addendum E). 
Other courts have voiced similar concerns about placing the onus on the victim to 
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challenge the robber to prove that he actually possess a weapon. For example, in Aaron v. 
Kelly, 65 F. Supp.2d 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the court held that the defendant was properly 
convicted under a New York statute that enhanced the crime of robbery if the robber 
"[displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other 
firearm.. rid. at 185 (citing N.Y.Penal Law § 160.10(2)(b)). The defendant was convicted 
of sneaking into a dorm house and robbing two students. While fleeing from one of the 
students, the defendant put his hand in his pocket and, in a "threatening manner," told the 
student chasing him to be quiet. Id. at 184. In rejecting the defendant's claim that his 
gesture alone was insufficient to constitute armed robbery under the statute, the court noted 
that New York caselaw had long held that that"' display of anything that appears to be [a 
firearm], though held inside a coat or otherwise obscured, is covered' by the law," thus 
elevating the level of offense for displaying what appears to be a firearm. Id. at 187. The 
court also stated that even if the student who pursued the defendant 
was in fact uncertain as to whether [defendant] had a gun or a knife, that 
would not affect the propriety of his conviction under New York law. "A 
robbery victim is not, in our view, required to call a robber's bluff, in order to 
allay any lingering uncertainty, before the armed offense is made out." 
Id. at 187 (citingPeople v. Bynum, 125 A.D.2d207,209, 509N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (1stDep't 
1986), affd, 70 N.Y.2d 858, 523 N.Y.S.2d 492, 518 N.E.2d 4 (1987)). 
The dangers of requiring a robbery victim to confirm that the hand or bulge in the 
robber's pocket is an actual weapon are apparent. It is inevitable that the clerk who is 
required to verify the existence of a weapon will end up injured or worse on the occasion 
when it turns out that the robber has a real weapon. This Court should not adopt a policy that 
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encourages such potentially disastrous confrontations. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the court of appeals decision in 
Ireland and defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^TV\lay of January, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Background: Defendant was convicted 
pursuant to conditional plea of guilty in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
Paul G. Maughan, J., of aggravated robbery. 
Defendant appealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
P.J., held that defendant's nonverbal gesture 
of pointing his hand inside his coat pocket 
close to his right side with his elbow 
extended constituted representation of 
dangerous weapon, so as to establish 
aggravated robbery charge. 
Affirmed. 
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Defendant's nonverbal gesture of pointing 
his hand inside his coat pocket close to his 
right side with his elbow extended 
constituted representation of dangerous 
weapon, so as to establish aggravated 
robbery charge; dangerous weapon statute, 
defining dangerous weapon as including 
facsimile or representation of any item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury, included nonverbal gestures, gesture 
was intended to look like gun for purpose of 
influencing sales person to give defendant 
all of the cash in cash drawer, and sales 
person reasonably believed that item was 
intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury. 
*1028 Michael A. Peterson and Joan C. 
Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and 
Brett J. DelPorto, Assistant Attorney 
General, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, P.J., and DAVIS and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
**1 Defendant William Joseph Ireland 
(Ireland) appeals the trial court's judgment 
convicting him of aggravated robbery under 
Utah Code section 76-6-302. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302 (2004). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 On December 6, 2003, Jeffrey 
Reinkoester (Reinkoester) worked as a sales 
person in the Fortier jewelry store in the 
Gateway Plaza in Salt Lake City. Ireland 
entered the store wearing a thick, puffy coat 
and a beanie. Reinkoester greeted Ireland 
who responded, "I want you to go and get 
me all the money in the cash drawer right 
now. I'm not kidding. Hurry." As Ireland 
made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester 
with his right hand, which he kept concealed 
in the pocket of his coat. Ireland's hand was 
held close to his right side with his elbow 
extending behind him. Reinkoester 
observed that Ireland gestured like he had a 
gun and described Ireland's hand in his coat 
pocket as "pointing at [Reinkoester]." 
Ireland's hand was "definitely gesturing like 
there was a weapon, but it was more subtle." 
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Ireland made no verbal statement that he had 
a gun or weapon, and Reinkoester did *1029 
not see a gun, but Reinkoester thought that 
Ireland might have a gun due to Ireland's 
gesturing in his pocket. Reinkoester thought 
he may be shot if he did not comply with 
Ireland's request. 
**3 Reinkoester walked behind the counter 
toward the cash drawer and put what little 
cash the store had in a bag. The counter was 
too high for Reinkoester to see Ireland's 
hands, so Reinkoester could not tell if 
Ireland had his hand in his pocket. Holding 
up a roll of quarters, Reinkoester asked 
Ireland whether he wanted the change and 
Ireland responded, "[F]ill it with jewelry." 
Before Reinkoester could fill the bag with 
jewelry, Ireland said, "[J]ust give it to me," 
grabbed the bag, and ran to the front door. 
**4 Meanwhile, Nelson Fortier (Fortier), 
the storeowner, realized a robbery was in 
progress. Fortier exited the store and 
attempted to block the doors so that Ireland 
could not exit. Ireland pushed and 
eventually opened the door. Fortier chased 
Ireland and demanded he return the money. 
Ireland complied, then ran away, but was 
later arrested. 
**5 Ireland was charged with one count of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony 
pursuant to Utah Code section 76-6-302, and 
theft of services, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code section 76-6-409. 
See Utah Code Ann. $ § 76-6-302, -409 
(2004). Ireland moved to reduce the charge 
of aggravated robbery to simple robbery, a 
second degree felony. After a hearing, the 
trial court denied the motion. Ireland 
subsequently entered a conditional plea of 
guilty to aggravated robbery, reserving the 
right to appeal the denial of his motion. 
Ireland now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
**6 At issue is whether the trial court 
properly interpreted Utah Code sections 76-
6-302 and 76-1-601 in convicting Ireland of 
aggravated robbery. We review the lower 
court's interpretation of statutes for 
correctness. See State v. Pixton, 2004 UT 
App275,f 4,98P.3d433. 
ANALYSIS 
**7 Ireland argues that the trial court erred 
by convicting him of aggravated robbery 
pursuant to Utah Code sections 76-6-302 
and 76-1-601 (the aggravated robbery and 
dangerous weapon statutes respectively) 
because there was insufficient evidence to 
support the conviction. The aggravated 
robbery statute provides that "[a] person 
commits aggravated robbery if in the course 
of committing a robbery, he ... uses or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302. The dangerous weapon 
statute defines "[djangerous weapon" as 
including a "facsimile or representation" of 
"any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury." Id. § 76-1-
60U5ya),(b). Moreover, "the actor's use or 
apparent intended use of the item [must] 
lead[ ] the victim to reasonably believe the 
item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury." Id $ 76-1- 60U5Yb)(T). 
**8 Utah courts have upheld convictions 
for aggravated crimes when there has been 
some kind of verbal representation or threat 
that the defendant possessed a dangerous 
weapon, even where the defendant did not 
display the weapon. See State v. Hartmann, 
783 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1989) (upholding 
conviction for aggravated sexual assault 
where defendant raped a woman while 
telling her that he had a gun); State v. 
Revos, 2004 UT App 15hTf 3, 91 P.3d 861 
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(upholding aggravated robbery conviction 
where defendant yelled, "Get the gun and 
shoot," and "shoot to kill" during the 
robbery but did not display a weapon); State 
v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 277 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995) (upholding sentence 
enhancement for robbery where defendant 
claimed to have a gun and threatened to kill 
the cashier but did not display or gesture that 
he had a weapon); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 
310, 311 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (upholding 
aggravated robbery conviction where 
defendant verbally threatened to use a gun 
while putting his hand on his bulging 
pocket). 
**9 Ireland argues that the pointing gesture 
inside his coat pocket does not constitute a 
"representation" because it was not verbal. 
We disagree and hold that the statute does 
not require a "representation" to be *1030 
verbal, but rather includes nonverbal 
gestures. 
**10 In Candelario, we interpreted the 
term "representation" in a similar section of 
the Utah Code to include nonverbal actions. 
909 P.2d at 278. Specifically, Utah Code 
section 76-3-203(2) (the enhancement 
statute) provides that a sentence may be 
enhanced by one year when " 'a dangerous 
weapon or a facsimile or the representation 
of a dangerous weapon, as provided in 
Section 76-1-601' " is used while 
committing a second degree felony. 
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203(2) (1995) (amended to what is now 
Utah Code Ann. $ 76-3-203.8 (2004))). We 
defined "representation" as "an expansive 
term," meaning "a statement conveying an 
impression for the purpose of influencing 
action." M Moreover, we noted that "[s]uch 
a statement can be either in the form of a 
verbal assertion or nonverbal action." Id. at 
278 n. 2 (citing Utah R. Evid. 801(a)). 
Therefore, we conclude that "representation 
of a dangerous weapon" as provided by 
section 76-l-601(5)(b) can be in the form of 
a nonverbal gesture.JTN1] 
FN1. Our conclusion is consistent 
with other jurisdictions interpreting 
statutory language similar to Utah's. 
These jurisdictions have found that 
nonverbal communications are 
sufficient to establish aggravated or 
armed robbery charges when the 
victim reasonably believes the 
defendant has a dangerous weapon. 
See State v. Ellison, 169 Ariz. 424, 
819 P.2d 1010, 1011, 1012 
(Ariz.Ct.App.1991) (upholding 
defendants' conviction of armed 
robbery under Arizona armed 
robbery statute where defendants 
committed robberies by 
"simulating] that they had handguns 
in their pockets at the time they were 
demanding money"); DeLeon v. 
State, No. CACR 89-118, 1989 WL 
148106, at *1 , 1989 Ark. App. 
LEXIS 608, at *3 (Ark.Ct.App. Dec. 
6, 1989) (upholding armed robbery 
conviction under Arkansas statute 
providing that defendant must 
Mrepresent[ ] by word or conduct" 
that he is armed with a deadly 
weapon where defendant asked for 
money while he had his hand in his 
pocket and the victim believed 
defendant had a weapon or gun in his 
pocket); State v. Arena, 235 Conn. 
67, 663 A.2d 972, 973, 978 (1995) 
(determining defendant's action of 
placing an opaque bag on the counter 
with an object inside pointing at the 
clerk while stating "[p]ut all the 
money in a bag" satisfied 
Connecticut's armed robbery statute 
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because defendant "represented by 
his words or conduct" that he had a 
firearm); State v. Lawrence, No. 
9706017912, 2001 WL 1021385. at 
*2. 2001 Del.Super. LEXIS 318. at 
*7 (Del.Super.Ct Aug. 28. 2001) 
(upholding conviction of robbery in 
the first degree under Delaware 
statute providing that defendant must 
"display[ ] what appears to be a 
deadly weapon" where defendant 
wrapped a cloth around his hand so 
that it appeared to hide a gun, and 
where the victim reasonably believed 
that defendant was armed (quotations 
and citations omitted)), affd, 790 
A.2d 476 (Del.2002); People v. 
Taylor, 245 Mich.App. 293. 628 
N.W.2d 55. 57. 61 (2001) (stating 
"we decline to hold that a defendant 
must verbally threaten the victim 
with some specific bodily harm in 
order to obtain a conviction of armed 
robbery" where armed robbery 
statute requires robber to be "armed 
with a dangerous weapon, or any 
article used or fashioned in a manner 
to lead the person so assaulted to 
reasonably believe it to be a 
dangerous weapon"); People v. 
Lopez, 135 A.D.2d 443. 522 
N.Y.S.2d 145. 146 (1987) (holding 
that where an unarmed robber holds 
his hand in his pocket so as to give 
the impression that he is holding a 
gun, he has " '[displayed] what 
appears to be a firearm' within the 
meaning of the [armed robbery] 
statute" and "there is no requirement 
that the object need be anything 
other than the defendant's hand" 
(first alteration in original) (quoting 
People v. Knowles, 79 A.D.2d 116. 
123. 436 N.Y.S.2d 25 (N.Y.1981))). 
**11 Turning to the facts of this case, we 
determine that Ireland's gesture of pointing 
his hand inside his coat pocket close to his 
right side with his elbow extended 
constitutes a representation of a dangerous 
weapon because such gesture was intended 
to look like a gun for the purpose of 
influencing Reinkoester to give Ireland all of 
the cash in the cash drawer. [FN2] 
FN2. Ireland relies heavily upon 
State v. Sunivilh 741 P.2d 961 
(Utah 1987). where 
Court held, 
the Utah 
under a Supreme 
previous version of the aggravated 
robbery statute, that the defendant 
did not commit aggravated robbery 
where he had his hand in his pocket 
held up over the counter as if he had 
a gun, and made threats that he 
would "blast" people if they did not 
cooperate. Id. at 962. The prior 
version of the aggravated robbery 
statute narrowly defined aggravated 
robbery as where the perpetrator 
used "a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon." Id; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76- 6-302 (1978). 
The court held that the "[defendant's 
menacing gesture accompanied by 
verbal threats is not sufficient 
evidence alone to establish the use of 
a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. 
To hold otherwise would pervert the 
language of section 76-6-302 and 
erode the statutory distinction 
between robbery and aggravated 
robbery." Id. at 965. However, since 
the Suniville decision, the Utah 
Legislature amended the aggravated 
robbery statute to include not only a 
"facsimile" but also a 
"representation" of "any item capable 
of causing death or serious bodily 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
601(5)(a),(b)(2004). 
*1031 **12 Moreover, we determine that 
Reinkoester reasonably believed that the 
"item [was] intended to cause death or 
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-l-601(5)(b)(i) (2004). Reinkoester 
testified that he feared that if he did not 
comply with Ireland's request, he may be 
shot. Guns by their very nature are capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury. 
Reinkoester's belief was based not only on 
the subjective belief that he thought Ireland 
had a gun, but also on objective evidence. 
Reinkoester saw something "pointing at 
[him]" inside Ireland's coat pocket. That 
something "looked like a gun." This is 
sufficient objective evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that one might have been 
injured if he or she did not comply. See, 
e.g., Parker v. State, 271 Ark. 84, 607 
S.W.2d 378, 379 (1980) (holding that 
victim's subjective apprehension coupled 
with defendant's objective conduct was 
sufficient to sustain a conviction of 
aggravated robbery); Faulkner v. State, 260 
Ga.App. 794, 581 S.E.2d 365, 367 (2003) 
(determining that victim had "reasonable 
apprehension" where defendant used his 
hand covered with a sock to look like a gun 
and pressed it against victim's back); People 
v. Taylor, 245 Mich.App. 293, 628 N.W.2d 
55, 61 (2001) (holding there was ample 
objective evidence that defendant either had 
a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately 
lead complainant to "reasonably believe" he 
had a gun where defendant "placed his hand 
inside his jacket and into the front of his 
pants"). 
CONCLUSION 
**13 We hold that the trial court correctly 
interpreted the aggravated robbery and 
dangerous weapon statutes and uphold 
Ireland's conviction for aggravated robbery. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
**14 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS 
and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judges. 
113 P.3d 1028, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 
2005 UT App 209 
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JACKSON. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
[f 1] *1 The State appeals an interlocutory 
order granting Defendant Ryan Wayne 
Johnson's motion to reduce the charges from 
aggravated robbery to robbery on six counts. 
The State argues that the trial court erred in 
interpreting the term "representation" of a 
dangerous weapon in Utah Code sections 
76-6-302 and 76-1-601 to include only 
verbal statements. Utah Code Ann. $ § 76-
6- 302, 76-1-601 (2004V The State avers 
that Johnson's use of his hand in his pocket 
to simulate a gun constitutes a nonverbal 
"representation" within the meaning of the 
Utah Code. Johnson argues that even if we 
determine nonverbal statements or gestures 
constitute a "representation" under the 
statute, the victims did not have a reasonable 
belief that "the item [was] likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury" as required 
by Utah Code section 76-1-601. [FNUId § 
76-l-60U5Xb)(T). We reverse on five counts 
and affirm on one count of the robbery 
charges. 
FN1. We review the trial court's 
interpretation of statutes for 
correctness. See State v. Pixton, 2004 
UT App 275^ 4,98P.3d433. 
[<| 2] Johnson was charged with a total of six 
counts of aggravated robbery in two separate 
criminal informations. Four counts allegedly 
occurred in December 2003 and two counts 
in January 2004. Victims testified that on 
each occasion Johnson approached the 
victim and asked for money, that Johnson 
had a bulge in his right pocket, that he had 
his hand in his pocket, and that something 
was protruding which looked like a gun. The 
testimony was that Johnson made no verbal 
threats nor did he tell any of the victims that 
he had a gun in his possession. In addition, 
some of the victims testified that they 
complied with Johnson's requests because 
they feared for their lives. 
fl[ 3] In State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 209. 
also issued today, we held that a 
"representation" constitutes both verbal and 
nonverbal statements or gestures. See id. at \ 
10. Because the facts of this case are nearly 
identical to those of Ireland, the same 
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reasoning applies. Consequently, we hold 
that the trial court erred in interpreting Utah 
Code sections 76-6-302 and 76-1- 601 and 
that a "representation" may be made by both 
verbal and nonverbal statements or gestures. 
For each of the six counts of robbery, 
Johnson's action of holding his hand in his 
pocket simulating a gun constitutes a 
"representation" within the meaning of Utah 
Code section 76-1-601. Johnson's conduct is 
sufficient to sustain aggravated robbery 
charges so long as the victims "reasonably 
belie [ved] the item [was] likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-60U5)(b)(i\ 
[f 4] After reviewing the record on each of 
the six counts, we determine that the victims 
had the requisite "reasonable belief to 
sustain an aggravated robbery charge in all 
but one of the six counts. In Ireland, we 
determined that there must be objective 
conduct by the defendant coupled with the 
victim's subjective apprehension to 
constitute a reasonable belief. See 2005 UT 
App 209 at 11 12. In five of the counts, 
victims testified that they saw or assumed 
that Johnson had a gun, and for that reason 
they complied with Johnson's request to give 
him money. However, the victim in Count I, 
occurring in January 2004, "didn't think 
[that Johnson had a gun] because the bulge 
wasn't big enough." Moreover, the victim 
stated she thought that Johnson "was very 
nice-spoken[,] ... not aggressive, not 
anything that would make you think that he 
was going to cause you harm." Clearly, this 
victim did not have the requisite reasonable 
belief that Johnson would cause "death or 
serious bodily injury," and the objective 
facts of the encounter reinforce this 
reasonable belief. Thus, there cannot be an 
aggravated robbery charge for this count. 
fl[ 5] *2 Accordingly, we reverse on the 
four counts occurring in December 2003 and 
Count II in January 2004 and hold that those 
counts sustain an aggravated robbery charge 
under Utah Code sections 76-6-302 and 76-
1-601. See Utah Code Ann. § § 76-6-302. 
76-1-601. We affirm Count I in January 
2004 as a robbery charge because the victim 
did not have the requisite reasonable 
objective belief to sustain an aggravated 
robbery charge. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and 
NORMAN H. JACKSON. Judges. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 1119638 
(Utah App.), 2005 UT App 210 
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UTAH CODE. 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
PART 6. DEFINITIONS 
76-1-601 Definitions, 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal 
action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is 
in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is 
capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, 
partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control 
over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily 
injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or 
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic 
storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing 
information in a form capable of being preserved. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
UT ST § 76-6-302 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302 
P> 
UTAH CODE. 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
PART 3. ROBBERY 
76-6-302 Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing 
a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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1 Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, March 17, 2004; a.m. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Good morning. State of Utah versus 
4 William Joseph Ireland, case ending 8349. 
5 Counsel, will you make your appearances for the 
6 record. 
7 MR. PETERSON: Mike Peterson representing 
8 Mr. Ireland, who is present. 
9 MR. BOWN: Greg Bown appearing for the State. 
10 THE COURT: And Mr. Ireland is with us? 
11 MR. PETERSON: He is. 
12 Your Honor, during the course of this hearing Ifm 
13 wondering if I could ask the Court to allow the unshackling of 
14 his writing hand so he can assist me. 
15 THE COURT: We'll leave him shackled. 
16 How many witnesses will you have? 
17 MR. BOWN: I have two, your Honor, but one has not 
18 shown up. But I do have Andrew Reinkoester, who is here, my 
19 only witness. 
2 0 THE COURT: Do you want to have him come up and be 
21 sworn. 
22 THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear to tell the truth, 
23 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God. 
24 I THE WITNESS: Yes. 
25 | THE COURT: Before you begin, Mr. Peterson, my 
1 understanding is this matter was set for jury trial, the trial 
2 has been cancelled and the sole issue today is whether or not 
3 Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first-degree felony or a 
4 second-degree felony. 
5 MR. BOWN: Yes, your Honor. The exact issue is the 
6 use of a dangerous weapon during the course of committing a 
7 robbery. 
8 THE COURT: Can you establish this and go forward 
9 with just one witness? 
10 MR. BOWN: I believe so, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. 
12 ANDREW REIDflKDESTER 
13 called as a witness in behalf of the State, having 
14 first been duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
15 follows: 
16 DIRECT EXMflHanON 
17 BY MR, BCWN: 
18 Q Will you state your name, please. 
19 I A Andrew Jeffrey Reinkoester. 
20 Q Please spell your last name. 
21 A R-E-I-N-K-O-E-S-T-E-R. 
22 Q Calling your attention to December 6th of 2 003, were 
23 you working on that day? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Where did you work? 
1 A At Fortier Jewelers. 
2 Q Where is that located? 
3 A That is at the northern end of Gateway Mall complex. 
4 Q 11 South Rio Grand? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Was that in Salt Lake County? 
7 A Yes. 
8 I Q And what do you do there? 
9 A I am a sales associate for the store. 
10 Q On December 16th, in the afternoon, did anything 
11 unusual happen? 
12 MR. PETERSON: Excuse me. It's December 6th. 
13 MR. BOWN: Excuse me. What did I say? 
14 MR. PETERSON: The 16th. 
15 Q (BY MR. BOWN) December the 6th. 
16 A Yes. We were robbed. 
17 Q About what time did this occur? 
18 A Between four and five o1clock. 
19 J Q Describe what you saw the person -- did the person 
20 rob you? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q This person who robbed you, where was this person 
23 when you very first saw this person? 
24 A Outside the store, coming towards the store. 
25 MR. BOWN: Okay. I think it might be helpful, your 
1 Honor, as we develop testimony, that he do a diagram of the 
2 interior of the store so we can have some idea of what he's 
3 doing. 
4 THE COURT: You may. If you want to pull that board 
5 out, you can write on it, the drawing board. 
6 Q (BY MR. BOWN) Now, what I would like you to 
7 do, Mr. Reinkoester, is do a diagram of the interior of Fortier 
8 Jewelry, and if you can keep it up high, that allows everybody 
9 to see where it was. And it's a blue marker to begin with, and 
10 just do the interior, not where everybody was, just the 
11 interior. 
12 A Okay. 
13 Q Could you draw the exterior walls as well? 
14 A Sure. 
15 Q Okay. Now, why don't you step just to this side, if 
16 you would, and describe what it is that you have drawn. 
17 A Okay. This is the entrance to the store, and these 
18 represent jewelry cases right here, here, and here. And this 
19 is the front desk. 
2 0 Q Okay. Now, for the record, the first indication that 
21 you had that you made was the --at the top of the diagram 
22 there is a broken --a line that is --
23 A Broken. 
24 Q -- broken. 
25 A Yes. 
1 Q That is the door? 
2 A That is the door. 
3 Q Does it swing inside or outside? 
4 A It does both. 
5 Q Looks like elbows, elbow-shaped boxes, three of them. 
6 Those are what? 
7 A Those are the jewelry cases. 
8 Q And there are spaces between those, right? 
9 A Right. 
10 Q What's there? 
11 A Like here? That's just a walkway to the center of 
12 store. 
13 Q Then there's a rectangular box. What is that? 
14 A That is the front desk. 
15 Q Okay. Where is the money for that store kept in 
16 Fortier Jewelry? 
17 A In the front desk. 
18 Q Is it in the drawer? 
19 A Yeah. 
20 Q Please indicate that. 
21 A Sure. 
22 Q Where that would be. 
23 A Drawer right here. 
24 Q Okay. Now, where were you -- let me give you a red 
25 pen, if I could, to decide where people are. 
1 In red and with a red pen indicate where you were 
2 when you first saw the person who came in? 
3 A I am right here. 
4 Q Put an ! X', red 'X' there. From the front the part 
5 of the store, I guess it would be on the north end? 
6 A Right. 
7 Q And where was the person who robbed you when you 
8 first saw him? 
9 A First saw him? 
10 Q Yes. Just outside the door, is that correct? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Okay. What happened after you first saw this person? 
13 A He came into the store. I greeted him. I said 
14 hello. And he said I want you to go and get me all the money 
15 in the cash drawer right now. 
16 Q Where was this person when he said that? Put a 
17 number one there, if you would. 
18 A Sure. Right here. 
19 Q Do you recognize the person, that said those things 
20 to you, in the courtroom today? 
21 A Yes, I do. 
22 Q Would you point to that person and describe what that 
23 person is wearing today. 
24 A It is the defendant in the yellow jumpsuit. 
25 MR. BOWN: Let the record reflect the identification 
1 of the defendant. 
2 THE COURT: The record will so reflect. 
3 Q (BY MR. BOWN) Tell me -- we'll get into some 
4 other details later, but showing movement, after that was 
5 stated to you, what did you do? 
6 A After that was stated, I circled around at his 
7 request and came to the cash drawer. 
8 Q So in the counter-clockwise way you went around the 
9 outside of the store? 
10 A Yes, around the periphery. 
11 Q Okay. Where did the defendant go while you were 
12 doing that? 
13 A He circled right here. 
14 Q Why don't you close that up and take the witness 
15 seat. 
16 When you first saw -- when you saw the defendant 
17 inside the store, how was the defendant dressed? 
18 A The defendant was wearing a very large coat, thick 
19 coat --it was brown -- and a beanie cap. 
20 Q Do you know what kind of pants he had on? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Was he doing anything -- let me ask you this. Did 
23 you see his hands? 
24 A I only recall -- I did not see his hands, no. 
25 Q Okay. And that's a bare hand that I'm talking about, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
A 
there was 
Q 
A 
Right. 
Did you see where his hands were? 
Yes. There was one hand in a pocket, gesturing like 
a gun. 
This coat is what kind of a coat? 
It's -- if I recall correctly it was a very thick 
thick brown coat. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
defendant 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Wool? Parka? Do you recall? 
Maybe down, if I remember correctly. 
Kind of puffy? 
Yes. 
Would you stand, please, and indicate how you saw 
!s hand in his pocket? 
Like my own pockets? 
No, just best you can. 
About like this. 
You have it against your body? 
Urn-hum. 
Towards -- if I were you --
Yes. 
--it would be pointing at me? 
Yeah. 
What did he say -- let me ask you this. Was that 
first thing you saw or heard? 
A Yeah. The first thing I said was hello, and the 
--
the 
the 
1 first thing I heard, the response was give me all the cash in 
2 the cash drawer. 
3 Q When, in relationship to that, get me all the cash in 
4 the cash drawer, was the hand in like this? 
5 A The whole time. 
6 Q So he started out that way? 
7 A Started out that way. 
8 Q Did you move at all? 
9 A No. 
10 Q Move back and forth? 
11 I A No. I said okay, and I went over there. 
12 Q Now, you had your hand kind of tucked in? 
13 A Right. 
14 Q Your arm kind of tucked back a little bit; is that 
15 J correct? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q So it was not pointing out far? 
18 A No, no. It was definitely gesturing like there was a 
19 weapon, but it was more subtle. Didn't say -- something like 
20 this, because there was a lot of other people in the store. 
21 Q Let me ask you this. Who else was in the store? 
22 A Myself, Cherie. 
23 Q Besides yourself. 
24 A Cherie, Nelson, Dominique, Warren, and two customers. 
25 Q Nelson, who's that? 
1 A He's the owner of the store. 
2 Q And after he said get me the money in the cash 
3 drawer, what did you do? 
4 A I said all right. I circled around and came behind 
5 the cash drawer and we met over there and I proceeded on 
6 getting the cash. 
7 Q Why did you do that? 
8 A Because I thought he had a weapon. 
9 Q Did he ever say he had a weapon? 
10 A No. 
11 Q What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon? 
12 A The motioning in the coat pocket. 
13 Q When you got over to the desk, what happened there? 
14 A I proceeded to start getting the cash out. I 
15 thought -- we didn't have a lot of cash. I fumbled around with 
16 bags for a little while. I started with clear bags and then 
17 grabbed a darker bag and put that in. And he said, "Is that 
18 all you've got?" And I was like, "Yes." And then I held out 
19 like a roll of quarters and said, "Do you want the change?" 
20 And he said, "Fill it with jewelry." 
21 Q While he's standing there, how far in front of the 
22 desk is he? 
23 A He's right up against the desk. 
24 Q Like I am to this podium? 
25 A Yes. 
1 Q How high is the desk where he is standing? 
2 A It's probably about somewhere in here. 
3 Q You're indicating mid chest? 
4 A Yeah. Standing about like this. 
5 Q Your mid chest? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Where did it hit? Where did the top hit the 
8 defendant? 
9 A Probably a little bit higher. I don't recall 
10 exactly. 
11 Q At that point did you see the hand that he had in the 
12 coat? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Why is that? 
15 A Just the desk was too high. 
16 Q What happened after you gave him the bag with the 
17 money? Let me ask you this. 
18 We got to the point where he said put some jewelry 
19 in --
20 A Yes. 
21 Q What happened at that point? 
22 A At that time Nelson noticed something was wrong over 
23 at the front desk and exited the store. And at that point I 
24 think he noticed --
25 MR. PETERSON: I object. Speculation as to what 
1 Nelson noticed. 
2 THE COURT: Sustained, 
3 Q (BY MR. BOWN) Tell me what you saw Nelson do. 
4 J A I saw Nelson exit the store. And he said, "Just give 
5 it to me," and I gave it to him and he ran to the front door. 
6 Q At any of that time -- was the defendant looking at 
7 you all the time? Or did he look anywhere else? 
8 A I can't recall. 
9 Q What happened after you gave him the bag? 
10 A He went to the front door and Nelson was on the other 
11 side, kind of blocking him. And he said, "Don't block the 
12 fucking door." And he pushed, and Nelson finally gave and he 
13 ran out and Nelson chased him. 
14 Q Do you recall whether at that time he took his hand 
15 out of the pocket? 
16 A I do not. 
17 Q Do you ever recall what was going on with his left 
18 hand during the entire time? 
19 A Other than taking the bag with the money -- I can't 
2 0 remember. 
21 Q So he took the bag of money with his left hand? 
22 A I can't remember. 
23 Q Did you ever see his right hand outside of the coat? 
24 A I can't remember. 
25 Q Okay. What happened after the defendant made it out 
1 the door? What did you see? 
2 A I saw him take off running and I saw Nelson chasing 
3 him. 
4 Q Did you go out yourself and — 
5 A I did not. 
6 Q Did you know whether or not the defendant had a gun? 
7 A Concretely no, but I assumed so. 
8 Q Based on what? 
9 A Based on the gesturing in the pocket. 
10 MR. BOWN: Just a moment, your Honor. 
11 I have no further questions. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Peterson. 
13 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. 
14 ci^ss-Exajyii^Ti^ 
15 BY MR. EETERSCN: 
16 Q Andrew, when you were located where you indicated on 
17 the diagram with the red !X! --
18 A Sure. 
19 Q — I take it you could see from this position through 
2 0 a glass door to the outside? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q And how long did you observe my client outside the 
23 door? 
24 A Probably about two seconds, walking, starting toward 
25 the glass door. 
1 Q Okay. What did you observe physically about my 
2 client as he walked toward the door? 
3 A Like in description of what he looked like? 
4 Q Um-hum. 
5 A Okay. I noticed that he had on the thick puffy coat 
6 and he had on a beanie. I noticed that he was very bristly, 
7 didn't shave in a day or two, and that he was coming very 
8 determined into the store. 
9 Q When you say "very determined," was he walking? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q So your sense is there was a man walking toward the 
12 store, he's coming in the store? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Naturally, to get in the store he has to open the 
15 door manually; correct? 
16 A Correct. 
17 Q Are you watching him as he comes in the door? 
18 A Yes, I am. 
19 Q Okay. So does Mr. Ireland reach out and open the 
20 door with his hand? 
21 A I do not remember. 
22 Q What do you remember about him opening the door? 
23 A Not much. I don't remember even if he opened it 
24 towards me or towards himself. 
25 Q Okay. All right. As he's walking toward the store 
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from the outside do you recall whether his hands are to the 
side swinging freely? 
A No, I don't recall. 
Q Do you recall anything about his hands as he's 
walking towards the store? 
A I do not. 
Q Do you recall whether you see Mr. Ireland carrying 
anything as he comes toward the store? 
A 0h7 like a bag? 
Q Or anything. 
A I didn't see him carrying anything. 
Q At any time, from the time Mr. Ireland comes into the 
Fortier store until he exits and runs away, did you see him 
carrying anything other than the bag you handed him? 
A No. 
Q When Mr. Ireland approached you, I take it that he 
walked directly to where you indicated with a number one? 
A Yes. 
Q And at that point you say how's it going? 
A Basically, yeah. Hello. 
Q And his response is hi, how are you? Or what's his 
response? 
A His response is I want you to go over to the cash 
drawer and get me the money. 
Q So there are no pleasantries. He just goes right to 
1 the money? 
2 A Correct• 
3 Q Okay. We're in December when this happens, right? 
4 A Right. 
5 Q And December down at the Gateway is wintertime? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q It's cold outside? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q People wear coats? 
10 A Urn-hum. 
11 Q Not infrequently people will maybe have hands inside 
12 a coat when they come in? 
13 A Sure. 
14 Q The exterior that we're talking about here, from the 
15 outside of the store to the inside, is all outdoors; right? 
16 A Right. 
17 Q So you have had customers come into Fortier Jewelry 
18 before in the wintertime with their hands inside a coat, 
19 correct? 
20 A Sure. 
21 Q Now, let's break down for Judge Maughn everything 
22 that my client says. 
23 A Okay. 
24 Q So when he's at position number one, that's when he 
25 demands money. 
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A Yes. 
Q Does he say anything else while you are standing at 
point 'X1 and he's at point one? 
A He says, "I'm not kidding. Hurry." 
Q How do you respond? 
A Mostly with a gesture. Like that. 
Q Okay. So you kind of shrug your shoulders? 
A Yes. 
Q Acknowledging that he demanded money? 
A Yes. 
Q Does he say anything else while he's standing at 
point one? 
A No. 
Q Is it after he said that that you begin to walk 
around the perimeter to the desk? 
A Yes. 
Q By the way, what prevents you from walking out the 
front door? 
A Walking out the front door? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Do you say anything to anybody as you walk from the 
jewelry case at point 'X' around the other case to the desk? 
A I had to pass behind Dominique and I think I said, 
"Excuse me, Dominique." 
1 Q Okay. Did you say anything else to anyone else? 
2 A No. 
3 Q As you're walking toward the desk? 
4 A No. 
5 Q What movement does Mr. Ireland do then when you walk 
6 around the case to the desk? 
7 A He just kind of comes and tracks me and comes to the 
8 desk. 
9 Q So he walks across the display room floor? 
10 A Um-hum. 
11 Q Essentially in a straight line? 
12 A Not exactly. More like kind of a half moon. 
13 Q Okay. Keeping a certain distance. As he's walking 
14 in this half moon, what did you observe about my client. 
15 A Not much. I was not actually looking at the client 
16 at that point. I was looking strictly at the cash drawer. 
17 Q While you're walking toward the desk do you hear my 
18 client say anything? 
19 A No. 
20 Q Do you hear him talk to anybody else, while he's in 
21 the store, besides you? 
22 A No. 
23 Q You get to the desk where the cash is, and where is 
24 my client at that time? 
25 A At the front of the desk. 
1 Q Okay. And at that point you don't know whether he 
2 has his hands outside his pockets or not, right? 
3 A Correct. 
4 Q He's not holding his hand in the pocket and gesturing 
5 the pocket up toward you any longer, correct? 
6 A Correct. 
7 Q What, if anything, does Mr. Ireland say while he's at 
8 the desk where you're getting the cash? 
9 A Okay. Get the money together and give it to him. 
10 And he says, "Is this all?" And I said, "Want the change?" 
11 And he's like, "Fill it with jewelry." That's it. 
12 Q At any time while you're getting the cash, putting it 
13 in the bag, does Mr. Ireland make any physical gestures toward 
14 you? 
15 A No. 
16 Q Is there anything else that Mr. Ireland says while 
17 he's at that desk? 
18 A After Nelson left the store, "Just give it to me." 
19 Q "Just give it to me," referring to --
20 A To the bag. 
21 Q To the bag. All right. Now, you've indicated, in 
22 answering some questions from Mr. Bown, that you felt like 
23 there might be something in Mr. Ireland's coat pocket other 
24 than a hand; right? 
25 A Yes, um-hum. 
1 Q The sole reason you say that is because he lifted his 
2 hand inside the pocket when he first encountered you where 
3 you!re marked at point f X! ? 
4 A Um-hum. 
5 Q Yes? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Mr. Ireland never says anything to you about 
8 possessing a weapon, correct? 
9 A Correct. 
10 Q Mr. Ireland never says anything to you about harming 
11 you with a weapon, correct? 
12 A Correct. 
13 Q And Mr. Ireland never makes any statements alluding 
14 to the possibility of shooting? 
15 A Correct. 
16 Q Or of cutting you? 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q You said to Mr. Bown your apprehension was maybe he 
19 had a gun, right? 
20 A Yes, um-hum. 
21 Q Obviously, that's speculation on your part; right? 
22 A Sure, yes. 
23 Q Why do you speculate that he had a gun as opposed to 
24 perhaps a knife? 
25 A There is no reason other than thatfs just what my 
1 itiind jumped to when I saw the bulge in the pocket, pointed at 
2 I rue. 
3 Q And you never said anything to Mr. Ireland about 
4 what's in the pocket? 
5 A No. 
6 Q So the bottom line, Andrew, is you don't have any 
7 idea whether he had a weapon in his pocket or not; do you? 
8 A Concretely, no. 
9 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, could I ask that an item 
10 be marked, please, as Defense No. 1? 
11 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 
12 was introduced.) 
13 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, may I approach the 
14 witness? 
15 THE COURT: You may. 
16 Q (BY MR. PETERSON) And I'm showing you a 
17 document, which is two-sided, now marked as Defendant's Exhibit 
18 No. 1. Do you recognize that? 
19 A Yes, I do. 
20 Q What is that? 
21 A That's the statement I filled out on the night of the 
22 robbery. 
23 Q And did the detective ask you to fill that out? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q You filled this out, obviously, close in time to when 
1 this robbery occurred; correct? 
2 A Correct. 
3 Q So that was fresh in your mind at that point, is that 
4 correct? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Let me ask you to read through blocks one, two, and 
7 three on the first page there. 
8 A Okay. Out loud? 
9 Q No. Just to yourself. 
10 A All right. Okay. 
11 Q Andrew, do you see anywhere in blocks one, two, or 
12 three where you filled out in your police statement any 
13 indication that my client had his hand in his pocket? 
14 A No. 
15 Q Do you see anywhere in that statement to the police 
16 where you stated anything about feeling that my client had a 
17 weapon? 
18 A No. 
19 MR. PETERSON: If I may have just one moment, your 
20 Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
22 (Mr. Peterson and the defendant confer.) 
23 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, may I retrieve the 
24 statement for Mr. Bown? 
25 THE COURT: Yes. 
1 MR. PETERSON: After Mr. Bown is through questioning 
2 here, your Honor, I'll move admission of Defendant's Exhibit 
3 No. 1, for the court's perusal. 
4 THE COURT: Any objection? 
5 MR. BOWN: I don't, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: It will be received. 
7 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 
8 was received into evidence.) 
9 MR. BOWN: If I may approach the witness. 
10 REDIRECT EXaMPSIATIQISr 
11 BY MR. BOWN: 
12 Q Let me show you the reverse side of Defendant's 
13 Exhibit 1. There's some what? Illustrations of weapons? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Did you, in there, write anything? 
16 A Yes, I did. 
17 Q Okay. What did you say in addition to the 
18 description? 
19 A In block seven? 
20 Q Block seven. 
21 A Block seven, additional description, weapon in pocket 
22 if there was one. 
23 Q So you did describe you thought there was a weapon. 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Now, Mr. Peterson said that you speculated there was 
1 a gun. Now, speculation is when there is no basis for it. Did 
2 you have a basis for believing that there was a gun? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q What was that? 
5 A Bulge in his pocket, the way it looked, pointed at 
6 me. 
7 Q Gesturing? 
8 A Yeah. 
9 Q As you were first approached and you were walking 
10 around to the desk, why didn!t you walk out the front door? 
11 A It did not occur to me. What was going on in my mind 
12 was there! s a guy who wants money and he may have a weapon. So 
13 I just was compliant. 
14 Q Why didn't you say anything about a robbery to 
15 Dominique? 
16 A Fear. 
17 Q Fear of what? 
18 A Fear of reprisal^ from the suspect. 
19 Q In what way? 
20 A Maybe being shot. 
21 Q When the defendant was in front of the desk where the 
22 money was, was he gesturing with his hand in his coat pocket? 
23 A At the desk I could not see his -- that part of his 
24 coat anymore. 
25 Q So you donft know if he was or was not? 
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A I don•t know. 
Q Is there any question in your mind that the defendant 
apparently intended to make you believe he had a gun? 
A No, there is no question. 
THE COURT: Would you repeat. I'm not sure I got the 
last part. 
MR. BOWN: Is there any question in your mind that 
the defendant apparently intended to make you believe he had a 
gun? 
MR. PETERSON: Well, I object. That calls for wild 
speculation. 
THE COURT: He already answered that. I was just 
asking for clarification. If he believed, he can believe 
whatever he wants. 
MR. PETERSON: Mr. Bown's asking did you believe 
Mr. Ireland believed something. 
THE COURT: No, that's not true. 
Q (BY MR. BOWN) It's -- is there any question in 
your mind that the defendant apparently intended to make you 
believe he had a gun? 
A No. 
MR. PETERSON: That calls for the witness to define 
what my client intended. 
MR. BOWN: No. There is an apparent intention, which 
is what the statute requires. 
1 THE COURT: Ifm going to overrule the objection, but 
2 you're certainly free to cross-examine him. 
3 MR. BOWN: I have no further questions. 
4 RECROSS EXAMINATiatsr 
5 BY MR. EETERSCN: 
6 Q Andrew, on the flip side of your witness report, 
7 which is marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1, which has now been 
8 admitted, when you comment about weapon in pocket, you say, "if 
9 there was one"; right? 
10 A Right. 
11 Q So to that extent there's speculation or guesswork at 
12 play about whether there was a weapon or not? 
13 A Right. 
14 MR. PETERSON: That's all I have. 
15 MR. BOWN: No further questions. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Reinkoester, thank you for being 
17 here. Would you hand me the exhibit, please, and then you're 
18 free to leave. 
19 Anything further? 
20 MR. BOWN: That's all the witnesses I can find. 
21 THE COURT: Do you want to look in the hall? 
22 MR. BOWN: If I may. 
23 He is not there, your Honor, so we have no further 
24 evidence at this time. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Peterson, do you intend to have any 
1 evidence at all? 
2 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we do not. I have advised 
3 Mr. Ireland, of course, he has the right to testify here and it 
4 is my advice for him that you not submit to testimony here 
5 today. 
6 Do you intend to follow that? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Sure. 
8 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we don't have additional 
9 witnesses to offer. Basically this is an 
10 eyewitness-observation issue relative to the elements in the 
11 statute, and so we're prepared to submit on the evidence and 
12 then move to the argument portion of the motion. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Peterson, it's your motion. Do you 
14 want to begin? 
15 MR. PETERSON: Yes. Thank you very much, Judge. 
16 Your Honor, you've had a chance to review, I hope, a 
17 courtesy copy of our memorandum that I submitted last week? 
18 THE COURT: I have. 
19 MR. PETERSON: And in this memorandum I cite the 
20 Court to basically four separate cases out of this jurisdiction 
21 that deal roughly with this issue, beginning with the 
22 requirement in Suniville that there be some kind of an actual 
23 showing of a facsimile. Of course, the rationale of the 
24 Supreme Court in that opinion was if we don't have something 
25 realistic looking, then we really are eroding the distinction 
1 between a first and second-degree robbery. And I understand 
2 that since Suniville was handed down the legislature has 
3 amended the language with regard to the aggravated-robbery 
4 statute in defining dangerous weapon to include 
5 representations. 
6 I The reason I cite the Court to the Adams opinion, 
7 the Hartman opinion, and the other opinion inside of -- the 
8 Candelario opinion is to suggest to the Court that appellate 
9 courts have taken a close look at this representation language, 
10 and although not explicitly readopting the Suniville standard 
11 have said that there needs to be something fairly direct, 
12 fairly poignant with regard to that representation in order for 
13 there to be a distinction with regard to the use or represented 
14 use of a weapon versus fear or force of fear, which is the 
15 element in a second-degree robbery. 
16 I would submit that the Adams, Hartman and 
17 Candelario cases are all maintaining that the substantial step 
18 has to at least be: I have a weapon. I'm going to blast you. 
19 I'm going to shoot you. I'm going to cut you. Something to 
20 indicate to a victim that if there is a concealed hand, which 
21 there was in at least one of these cases, that there be some 
22 form of verbal representation that gives reasonable 
23 apprehension to the victim that there is imminent danger from 
24 the use of a weapon. 
25 In the present case, Judge, our argument is we don't 
1 have the imminency present here. I understand --
2 THE COURT: Let me ask you this question. 
3 MR. PETERSON: Sure. 
4 THE COURT: What if you had the same testimohy that 
5 was just elicited on the stand, and the defendant left -- was 
6 apprehended as he subsequently was and he had a revolver in his 
7 right-hand pocket. Would he be guilty of a first degree or a 
8 second degree? 
9 MR. PETERSON: My position is no. 
10 THE COURT: No. It has to be one or the other. 
11 MR. PETERSON: I'm sorry. I thought your question 
12 was would he be guilty of a first degree. 
13 He would be guilty of a second degree, in my 
14 opinion, because it's the apprehension at the time that the 
15 robbery is occurring that's critical as opposed to the 
16 after-developed discovery and fact that there was an actual 
17 robbery. 
18 THE COURT: Well, what about the witness's 
19 apprehension? His testimony was I was afraid I'd get shot or 
20 cut if I didn't. 
21 MR. PETERSON: Actually, his testimony was I was 
22 afraid I would get shot, not cut. 
23 THE COURT: I agree he didn't say cut, but he thought 
24 it was a weapon. A gun versus a knife. But my point is he 
25 thought he would be injured. 
1 MR. PETERSON: Right. And I understand that he has 
2 testified to that, Judge, but under cross-examination, as we 
3 develop the testimony, he said, well, yeah, I -- that was 
4 guesswork. That was speculation. It was my speculation. 
5 Which of course he's entitled to whatever apprehension he!s 
6 entitled to. 
7 But what I'm suggesting is when we're drawing a 
8 distinction between a first degree and second degree, under a 
9 Suniville type of analysis, it's not just the subjective belief 
10 of the victim that is critical. There's a certain objectivity 
11 and objective legal standard that enters into play. Otherwise, 
12 we would simply erode the distinction between a first and a 
13 second and leave it totally up to the subjective apprehension 
14 of the victim. 
15 What I'm suggesting to the court is the Suniville 
16 case and other cases that have followed since the legislative 
17 amendment impose a certain objective element such that the 
18 court in the, you know, calmer light of months after the fact 
19 can analyze whether there was a realistic apprehension of a 
20 weapon or not. 
21 If you deem that there was, then there is legal 
22 sufficiency for maintaining this prosecution as a first-degree 
23 felony. I'm simply saying that without Mr. Ireland suggesting 
24 he was going to shoot or cut, that the lifting of the hand was 
25 not sufficient, under this legislative language, to elevate the 
1 matter from a second to a first degree. 
2 THE COURT: You assume Suniville is law? 
3 MR. PETERSON: Well, I think Suniville is informative 
4 law. I'm not going to say it's binding on this court because 
5 the legislature amended the statute after the Suniville 
6 decision and broadened the language. I'm not here to deny that 
7 at all. I'm simply suggesting that a lot of the Suniville 
8 rationale ought to be brought to bear as we analyze the 
9 language and the other cases that have come down after the new 
10 amendment when we talk about the dangers of eroding the first 
11 and second-degree distinction here. 
12 THE COURT: Well, if you go to Adams for a minute. 
13 MR. PETERSON: Right. 
14 THE COURT: That's a court of appeals decision. 
15 Adams never mentions Suniville. 
16 MR. PETERSON: Um-hum. 
17 THE COURT: But on facts that are very, very similar, 
18 in my mind, the court of appeals upheld the conviction that 
19 Suniville overruled. Do you agree with that? 
20 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, I think that that is true. 
21 I think that the Adams court absolutely relied on the new 
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language of the statute with regard to representation in 
deciding to distinguish the facts of the Adams case from the 
Suniville case. But what I do also think that is critical 
about Adams for the court to analyze is the verbal component 
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where the defendant in that case, in addition to having the 
bulge in the pocket, said that he would shoot the Taco Bell 
clerk he was robbing. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. PETERSON: No. Thank you, Judge. 
MR. BOWN: Just briefly, your Honor. My memo 
basically, is still, down to a few words is, to just read the 
statute. The statute we're talking about is 76-1-601(5) which 
talks about what is a dangerous weapon, and that is referred to 
in the aggravated robbery statute. 
And there aren't very many people, I guess, who were 
around when Suniville came down, but that was my case. I 
remember it very vividly. I recall there was a huge outcry 
after that decision came down and the legislature did, in the 
very next session, amend it to this very broad language in 
76-1-601, saying that, "dangerous weapon" means any item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury -- and I 
think it's not disputed that a firearm would fit in that 
category -- or a facsimile or representation of the item. 
In Suniville it was a prior statute, and I have it 
in my memo that it was, the statute was simply used a deadly 
weapon or a facsimile -- that's all it says -- of that weapon. 
Basically, the way we looked at the Suniville case 
was that when you point a gun you've got to do a photocopy of a 
gun and show it to them in order to have it under that 
1 rationale. 
2 So the end result is that the legislature broadened 
3 the definition of dangerous weapon and in effect told the 
4 supreme court we exactly mean that, that if it's a verbal 
5 representation; if it's a non-verbal representation such as 
6 gesturing with a hand in the coat or in a pocket, that's 
7 enough. And if you look at the statute itself it says that if 
8 there is not -- if you don't have the item capable of causing 
9 death or serious bodily injury, a facsimile or representation 
10 of the item. "Representation" means -- I looked in the 
11 dictionary for what "representation" meant and several things 
12 come out. It means to serve as a sign or symbol of; to serve 
13 as the counterpart or image of; to take the place of in some 
14 respect; state in a manner intended to effect action or 
15 judgment; to serve as a specimen, example, or instance of; to 
16 form an image or a representation of in the mind; to correspond 
17 to in essence. 
18 All that means that it is in the statute. If 
19 someone represents, by verbal or non-verbal conduct, that they 
20 have a weapon, that's enough. 
21 And it says in (5)(b)(i) that the actor's use or 
22 apparent intended use -- very broad, very low standard --of 
23 the item, and that means is there something that would give 
24 basis to someone to believe that the item is a firearm, in this 
25 case. And that apparent intended use leads the victim to 
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reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury. 
And I submit that's exactly what we have in this 
case, that the victim had -- did not speculate because 
speculation based on facts is not speculation. It is a belief. 
It is not speculation at all. It is — that's what the witness 
testified to, that he believed, I would submit, reasonably 
believed based on what he saw, that the gesturing by the 
defendant caused him to do things that he would not have done 
otherwise. It was all reasonable. 
An apparent intended use is not -- intentionally, we 
don't get into his intent. Just his apparent intended use. 
In (b)(ii) it says or the actor --or the actor 
represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner. 
There are a couple of things that were interesting 
that I saw, and that is in Rule 801 of the Rules of Evidence it 
defines a statement. This is just before hearsay. And it 
defines a statement: Statement is an oral or written assertion 
19 or nonverbal conduct of a person. So a statement is nonverbal 
conduct or an oral or written assertion if that nonverbal 
conduct is intended by the person as an assertion. 
In the definition 76-1-601 an act means voluntary 
bodily movement and it includes speech. Act and statement seem 
to be almost the same. And I would submit that what the 
legislature intended was that if the defendant -- if a person 
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who robs somebody says he has a gun, that's enough. If he 
indicates in any other matter that he has a gun, that's enough 
to make it an aggravated robbery. And the subjective part is 
if the apparent intended use leaves the victim to reasonably 
believe that he has one, has a gun, that's enough. 
Very broad statute, and I submit that under the 
facts of this case, that contemporaneous with the demand for 
money, we have a gesture which is reasonably interpreted by the 
clerk that he may or may not have a gun, but he does things 
because -- that he would not have done otherwise because of 
that gesture. And I submit, based on all that, that the 
legislature intends that the facts of this case be charged and 
constitute the offense of aggravated robbery, first-degree 
felony. 
THE COURT: This statute was amended in 1989, 
correct? Or close to it? 
MR. BOWN: Close to it. I know Suniville came out 
and it was just right after that that the legislature amended 
the statute. 
THE COURT: Well, I have done a search in this area 
and I don't pretend it to be exhaustive, but every subsequent 
case indicates there has got to be something more than a bulge 
in a pocket, that I can read. And every other case takes the 
definition, and if there has been a conviction upheld it's 
because of some corroborating statement: I have a gun. I have 
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a knife. I'll use this. 
Even Suniville, I think, wouldn't stand up today, 
with this new definition. 
MR. BOWN: I think it would. 
THE COURT: You think Suniville --
MR. BOWN: Yes. He had the finger and he was saying 
I"11 blow you away. 
THE COURT: I mean the holding in Suniville. 
MR. BOWN: Holding. Excuse me. Yes. I thought you 
meant the facts, and I believe you're right. 
THE COURT: So I have something here and -- but I'm 
troubled by two things. One, I don't think that employees or 
anybody else should have to second-guess what is going on in an 
accused's mind when they put their hand in their pocket. 
Obviously, something is intended. If nothing were intended in 
this case, you walk in and say -- hands in view, whatever --
give me your money. But as soon as somebody starts to hold 
their weapon in their hand in a manner which to most of us 
would indicate -- certainly would indicate to me that there was 
a weapon involved the way the hand is being held, the way the 
command is made to get money. I think all of us, or most 
people, would be alarmed, and I think it's unfair to put the 
burden upon a victim in that case and say, well, show me what!s 
there, at the risk of being blown away or stabbed or hit or 
hurt. 
1 On the other hand, that may be a baseball, golf 
2 ball, nothing. And in this case apparently no weapon was ever 
3 found. That doesn't necessarily mean one wasn!t used at the 
4 time. 
5 But, Mr. Bown, what does "represent" mean? The term 
6 "representation"? 
7 MR. BOWN: That's the question I had, too, your 
8 Honor. To represent is to make it known to other persons, 
9 something like a gun. 
10 THE COURT: Well, I think you've met the statute 
11 where it says the actor's use or apparent intended use of the 
12 item leads the victim to reasonably believe that the item is 
13 likely to cause death or serious injury. Number two doesn't 
14 apply, that the actor didn't represent verbally -- well, maybe 
15 he did when it says any other manner he's in control of an 
16 item. But those are predicate to the facsimile or 
17 representation. That's why I ask what "representation" means. 
18 MR. BOWN: Well, it's not an identical thing because 
19 that's a facsimile. But "representation" is something that is 
20 a sign or a symbol of, or a form, or image, or representation 
21 of something that in the mind of someone corresponds to an 
22 incidence. And I would submit that a hand, an arm -- let me 
23 put it this way. An unseen hand in a coat pocket, especially 
24 when it's in a gesturing mode, is in fact a representation, 
2 5 nonverbal representation, I have a gun. And he could have had 
1 his hand in his pocket like this, like Napoleon in his 
2 pictures. I don't believe that would be an indication that he 
3 has a gun. Or if he has his hands in his pockets and they're 
4 down loose, not pointing at anything, I don't think that's a 
5 representation of anything. 
6 When it is up with an arm at almost a 90-degree 
7 angle or near there, that's a indication, that's a 
8 representation that there is a gun. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 Mr. Peterson, I'll give you the last word if you 
11 want. 
12 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. 
13 I Your Honor, I appreciate the Court's inquiry and 
14 sensitivity to the fine distinctions that we're drawing here. 
15 The reason I don't think the representation element 
16 is met in this case is partly the fact sensitivity of the time 
17 of year. If this were the middle of July and someone is in 
18 there with a ski parka, with a hand in his pocket you might 
19 have more apprehension than you would in the dead of winter, 
20 particularly the tough winter that we had here in December. 
21 Somebody comes in with a parka on, with their hands --at least 
22 one hand, maybe two hands, huddled up inside their coat. I 
23 don't know about your Honor, but many times when I have my ski 
24 jacket, or other jacket, I put my hands up in the coat and I 
25 put my hands up at that very right angle Mr. Bown just 
1 indicated. And that is not an unreasonable position, or 
2 gesturing, for that particular time of year, particularly when 
3 you're coming in directly from a cold street, which we have at 
4 the Gateway Mall, into a store. 
5 So I'm just suggesting that under the cases that 
6 have been decided after the legislative amendment that there 
7 needs to be at least some additional language used by 
8 Mr. Ireland or the showing of something out of that pocket for 
9 there to be a distinction between a first and second-degree 
10 robbery. 
11 THE COURT: All right. I will let you know within 
12 two weeks, probably or hopefully shorter than that. 
13 Once I have issued my decision, what is the intent 
14 of the parties? 
15 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, if the Court decides in 
16 the State's favor here, I have already executed a Sery plea 
17 form that everybody has analyzed and is prepared to sign. If 
18 the Court rules in our favor that the elements here are only 
19 sufficient for a second-degree robbery, I will rewrite the plea 
20 form and Mr. Ireland will plead to the second-degree robbery. 
21 And in that regard, Judge -- I know it doesnrt go to 
22 the merits of your decision -- I just want everyone to know 
23 Mr. Ireland's intent has been to resolve this case and plead 
24 this case out rather than try it. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. 
1 Anything further, Mr. Sown? 
2 MR, BOWN: No, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, either way I go, whoever 
5 prevails here will prepare the Findings of Fact and Order for 
6 your Honor's signature. In that regard I!m wondering whether 
7 it would benefit the Court if I provided you a copy of the 
8 transcript. 
9 THE COURT: If you would like to, that's fine. 
10 MR. PETERSON: As you analyze your decision situation 
11 here. In that case, I just ask that we have an expedited copy 
12 of the transcript, if possible. 
13 THE COURT: Are you paying for that? 
14 MR. PETERSON: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: Fine with me. Thank you. 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor. 
17 MR. BOWN: Are we going to have a review date? 
18 THE COURT: We'll set it -- if today is the 17th --
19 on the 29th at 8:30. 
20 MR. PETERSON: And you want Mr. Ireland brought up at 
21 that point, correct? 
22 THE COURT: That will be fine. 
23 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, is that your regular 
24 Monday law and motion? 
25 THE COURT: Yes. 
1 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. 
3 (Proceedings in the above-entitled matter were 
4 I concluded.) 
5 
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Addendum E 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 031908349 
This matter was brought before the Court by Motion on March 
17, 2004. The State has brought aggravated robbery charges against 
defendant William Joseph Ireland, pursuant to Section 76-6-302, 
Utah Code Ann. Mr. Ireland has waived his right to a jury trial, 
and intends to enter a guilty plea. The sole issue before the 
Court is whether Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first or second degree 
felony. Mr. Ireland is prepared to admit that on December 6, 2003, 
he entered Fortier Jewelers located in the Gateway Mall at 11 S. 
Rio Grande Street, and demanded jewelry and money from a store 
employee. 
The testimony of the employee/witness established that the 
defendant entered the store with his right hand in his coat pocket. 
The coat was described as large and puffy, perhaps a parka. The 
defendant's hand was held close to his right side, with the elbow 
extending toward the back or behind the defendant. While the 
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defendant's hand was in this position, he told the witness, "I want 
you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now." 
The witness described the defendant's action as: "There was one 
hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun." (Hearing Tr. p. 
11.) The witness also described the defendant's hand in the 
defendant's coat pocket as "pointing at me." (Hearing Tr. p. 11.) 
He further described the defendant's hand as "it was definitely 
gesturing like there was a weapon, but it was more subtle." 
(Hearing Tr. p. 12.) The witness then testified that he thought 
the defendant had a weapon based on the motioning of the 
defendant's hand in the defendant's coat pocket. (Hearing Tr. p. 
13.)' 
The witness admitted he did not know whether the defendant had 
a gun and that he never saw a gun, but assumed the defendant had a 
gun because of the gesturing of the defendant' s hand in the 
defendant's coat pocket. (Hearing Tr. at p. 16.) Additionally, 
the bulge in the defendant's pocket, and the way it looked, pointed 
at the witness led the witness to believe the defendant had a 
weapon. (Hearing Tr. at p. 2 7.) At the time of the robbery, the 
witness felt that the defendant may have had a weapon in his hand, 
and the witness testified that he was afraid that he might be shot 
if he did not comply with the defendant's request. (Hearing Tr. at 
p. 27.) It was the witness's further impression that the defendant 
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intended to make the witness believe that the defendant had a gun 
in his pocket; and he did so believe. (Hearing Tr. at p.28.) 
The issue before the Court is whether a nonverbal gesture 
constitutes a "representation" of a dangerous weapon pursuant to 
Section 76-1-601, Utah Code Ann. This issue appears to be one of 
first impression in the state of Utah. 
In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court overturned an aggravated robbery conviction based on 
a prior statute where the defendant had stated, "This is a robbery, 
don't turn it into a homicide. Give me all of your money." Id. at 
962. The defendant approached the teller with his right hand 
inside of his coat pocket, which he lifted over the counter. The 
witness testified that, "something was pointing at me in his 
pocket." Jd. at 962. Based upon those facts and the statute in 
effect at the time, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant had 
not used a firearm, or a facsimile of a firearm, or a deadly 
weapon. Id. at 965 (relying on Utah Code Ann., Section 76-6-302 
(1975), which stated that " [a] person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses a firearm or a 
facsimile of a firearm...or a deadly weapon...."). 
In apparent response to the Suniville decision, the 
legislature amended Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Ann., which reads 
in pertinent part: 
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(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon.... 
Section 76-1-601, defines "dangerous weapon" as: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the 
item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent 
intended use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) The actor represents to the 
victim verbally or in any other manner that he 
is in control of such an item. 
A review of the case law in this state since Suniville 
indicates that convictions of defendants have been upheld where a 
defendant made a verbal representation that he or she has a gun or 
will use a gun or a weapon and the statement is accompanied with a 
show of an apparent weapon, that is, a hand in a pocket. See, 
e.g., State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310 (Utah App. 1992). This Court 
must decide whether a representation may be made by a hand and 
gestures of the hand absent a verbal representation. This Court 
concludes that the elements of the crime alleged in this case have 
been met by the defendant's gestures as set forth above. 
In the case before the Court, the witness clearly indicated he 
felt the defendant had a weapon. As the Court indicated during the 
course of the hearing, it is not fair, reasonable or wise to place 
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the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in the 
defendant's pocket is or is not a weapon. 
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce a victim to 
believe the defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to 
perform some act based on the defendant's representations and then 
allow the defendant to benefit when it is later shown the defendant 
in fact had no such weapon. The Court finds in this case that the 
defendant's placement of his hand in his pocket and the gesturing 
accompanying it, as testified to by the witness, constituted a 
representation. Therefore, the State is within its discretion in 
charging this matter as a first degree felony. 
Although the statutory language governing aggravated robbery 
seems to clearly encompass the defendant's actions, this Court is 
further persuaded that the defendant can be charged with aggravated 
robbery by the case law of other states interpreting statutes 
similar to ours. Whether a weapon or a facsimile is actually 
displayed in the commission of a crime, or a verbal representation 
that such a weapon is in the possession of the perpetrator, or 
whether the representation is made by menacing gestures, the effect 
is the same on the victim. A facsimile of a gun can cause no more 
harm than leading one to believe the perpetrator actually has a 
gun, whether by word or action. The Utah statute is similar to 
that found in New York. New York's law reads: 
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A person is guilty of robbery in the second 
degree if he forcibly steals property and if, 
in the course of the commission of the crime 
he lf [displays] what appears to be a pistol, 
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or 
other firearm." 
N.Y. Penal Law § 160.10(2) (b) , as quoted in People v. Knowles, 436 
N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1981). The Supreme Court appellate division 
of New York held in Knowles: 
We hold today that if a person who is in fact 
unarmed commits a robbery and, in the course 
thereof, positions his hand in his pocket in a 
manner that is intended to convey to his 
victim the impression that he is holding a 
firearm, that said person has committed 
robbery in the second degree within the 
meaning of the statute quoted above. 
436 N.Y.2d at 25. 
Delaware's statute is also similar to Utah's, and in State v. 
Lawrence, 2001 Del. Super. Lexis 318 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 
2001), aff fd, 790 A.2d 476 (Del. 2002), held that the term 
"displays" included a defendant's act of wrapping a cloth around 
his hand so that it appeared to hide a gun, and where the victim 
reasonably felt- that the defendant was armed. 
The facts of this case are very similar to Deleon v. Arkansas, 
1989 Ark. App., Lexis 608 (1999) , which interpreted another statute 
much like Utah's. In Deleon, the defendant entered a convenience 
store to purchase a pack of cigarettes, and stated to the clerk, 
"Would you mind filling me up a sack?" Id. at *2. As the clerk 
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reached for a bag, he noticed that the man had his hand in his 
pocket. Id. The clerk testified, "I figured he had a weapon in his 
pocket or a gun." Id. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas stated 
that when the defendant put his hand in his pocket, he did so "for 
the purpose of inducing the belief that he was armed with a deadly 
weapon and that although he used no threatening words [as to the 
use of a weapon] , his conduct had the desired effect upon the 
victim," who perceived the defendant's actions to be menacing or 
threatening. Id. at *4. 
This Court believes that the reasoning of these cases is sound 
and consistent with the terms of Utah's revised statute, and 
concludes that "representation" includes not only words, but 
threatening gestures and movements which would indicate the 
defendant is in possession of a dangerous weapon. 
The State's filing of this action as a first degree felony is 
upheld. 
The State is to prepare the approprJ^t^E.indings, Conclusions 
and an Order. 
Lday of April, 
PAUL G\*l 
DISTRICT:CpU£;r^ 
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